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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to explore the philosophies underpinning economic approaches to the study of entrepreneurship. Economic theories have made significant contributions and are one of the historical roots of the subject (Bygrave, 1989) . Despite these contributions the concept of the 'entrepreneur' and the function of entrepreneurship in society have ranged extensively within theories (Hébert and Link, 1988) . Previous categorisations have shown that the 'entrepreneur' has been viewed as a class of economic actor, a capitalist, a manager, an owner, an arbitrageur, an innovator and the bearer of uncertainty (Binks and Vale, 1990) . These early theories of entrepreneurship continue to have a profound affect on the meaning of 'entrepreneurship' within contemporary society and consequently influence current debate in the subject (Kirchhoff, 1991) . Although previous research has explored many of the differences between economic theories contributing to our understanding there is only limited prior work on the philosophical basis of these differences (Barreto, 1989) . The purpose of the paper is to explore these 'taken for granted' assumptions explaining some of the fundamental differences that exist in key conceptions of the 'entrepreneur'. Understanding these differences is important because it helps us recognise the factors which influence policy interventions designed to promote 'entrepreneurship' and 'enterprise'.
Meta-theory, which can be translated as the philosophical assumptions made by researchers before they construct theories, plays an important role in how theory is developed and the type of 'knowledge' found when research is conducted (Grant and Perren, 2002) . Researchers in entrepreneurship have recently begun to recognise that ideology, or the political basis of ideas, meta-theory and other 'taken for granted ' assumptions (axioms) have an influence on knowledge construction and they have begun to explore the issue (Bygrave, 1989; Aldrich, 2000; Ogbor, 2000; Grant and Perren, 2002) . This paper makes a contribution to these discussions by exploring the philosophical assumptions that underpin many of the key economic theories. A review of meta-theory is carried out by using Burrell and Morgan's (1979) paradigms to assess the assumptions made in economic theories, illustrating their contribution to contemporary debate. The study conducted is reported and the implications for future study are highlighted.
PHILOSOPHIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
Discussions about meta-theory have become a key feature of academic enquiry in many social sciences. In organisational studies the publication of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) 'Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis' led to considerable debate throughout the 1980s and 1990s in organisational studies (McCourt, 1999) . There are potentially many gains for the study of entrepreneurship if researchers are prepared to learn from the experience of these debates. For example, Burrell and Morgan's work highlighted the role of philosophies in research endeavour; it informed researchers about the complexities of organisational enquiry and raised awareness about the influence of research paradigms on knowledge construction (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) . [take in Figure I ] The paradigms were constructed by reviewing organisational research according to certain types of philosophical assumption. These included: i)
Ontological assumptions -ontology is a branch of meta-physics, a part of philosophy that examines the nature of being. Ontological assumptions, therefore, focus on the nature of reality, and are about how reality is constructed and represented in human consciousness.
ii) Epistemological assumptions -epistemology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the nature of knowledge, together with its sources and forms. Epistemological assumptions are about how people understand and conceptualise the world around them, making assumptions about what constitutes knowledge, how it might be constructed and appropriately communicated.
iii) Assumptions about human nature -focus on the different assumptions about human activity and behaviour that underlie theory. These typically revolve around a series of debates about human behaviour. For example, one such debate between 'free-will' and 'determinism' concerns the degree to which human beings have the ability to act on their environment or whether circumstances beyond their control determine behaviour.
iv)
Assumptions about the nature of society -are assumptions about how society works. The main debate focuses on the sociology of order, assuming that every society is relatively stable, in contrast to the sociology of conflict, which assumes that deep-seated structural conflict occurs within society.
An assessment of these philosophies in organisational studies led Burrell and Morgan (1979) to conclude that there were two dimensions to philosophical debate in social sciences, the subjective versus objective dimension and the regulation versus radical change dimension. These dimensions represented different views about the nature of social science which they constructed into four paradigms. The word 'paradigm' was used to describe different forms of social science demonstrating fundamentally different philosophical orientations. In their view the paradigms are "contiguous but separate" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 22) . In this sense the paradigms were originally considered to be incommensurable; if a researcher undertook work in one paradigm they were likely to be unable to appreciate the philosophical basis of study in alternative paradigms. By contiguous they meant each paradigm had shared characteristics but that there was sufficient differentiation for them to be considered as four distinct entities. The four paradigms were described as functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist. Gioia and Pitre (1990) summarise the theory building approaches of each of the four paradigms (see Table I )
[take in Table I ]
Disagreement surrounding the thesis continues and revolves around a number of themes. The first theme focuses on the nature of paradigms (Weaver and Gioia 1994) , which has included disputes about how paradigms should be viewed. Some researchers have argued that paradigms are ways of bringing unification to organisational study (Pfeffer 1993) . Some have reasoned that the research community should protect and foster new paradigms (Willmott 1993a ) and others have argued that paradigms are different ways of understanding social scientific phenomena (Scherer and Steinmann 1999) . The second theme has concentrated on the use and meaning of the word 'paradigm'. For some, the concept of a paradigm has been eroded of its rigour (Holland 1990 ) and for others; it continues to represent a valuable means for differentiating between philosophical assumptions (McCourt 1999). In the third theme researchers have engaged in debates about incommensurability, where views have ranged comprehensively. They have included relatively strict interpretations (Jackson and Carter 1991; 1993) seeing little room for communication across paradigms. There have been approaches seeking to question the concept of incommensurability between paradigms (Hassard 1998; Holland 1990; Willmott 1993a; 1993b) , as well as, attempts to build multi-paradigm communication (Gioia, Donnellon and Sims, 1989; Gioia and Pitré 1990) . Other arguments have suggested that the concept of paradigm is itself problematic and have suggested more complex alternatives (Weaver and Gioia 1994; Scherer and Steinmann 1999) . The final theme has centred on the common divisions thought to exist in organisational enquiry that underlie Burrell and
Morgan's schema and these researchers question these divisions. Critiquing BM's paradigms as an over simplification of complex philosophical debates they argue that BM's approach overlooked other important philosophical discussions i . Such arguments also question the implied duality within the two dimensions outlined, suggesting that these over simplify complex debates in social science and philosophy (Davies, 1998) .
Despite these debates, disagreements and complexities the value of this stream of work in organisational studies has been its ability to raise awareness about the importance of meta-theory when constructing research in the social sciences. This paper seeks to build on these benefits for the subject of entrepreneurship by reporting a historical analysis that used a technique adapted from this stream of work in organisational studies. Consequently, the paper will explore the usefulness of the paradigms in a different subject domain and build on other approaches that have used them as tools for exploring implicit philosophical assumptions in research. These prior studies include Holland's work on professional education (Holland 1990 ), McCourt's (1999) analysis of personnel selection and Grant and Perren's (2002) analysis of contemporary study in entrepreneurship. The main contribution of the paper is that it applies some of the insights identified in organisational studies to an analysis of the economic theories in entrepreneurship.
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of the paper, as outlined, is to contribute to debate by applying BM's paradigms as a method to explain the philosophical assumptions used in economic studies of entrepreneurship. A number of developments were necessary to use BM's thesis outside organisational studies and these will be outlined, there were two key operational questions:
i) Given the incommensurability debate outlined previously, how are the paradigms viewed in this study?
ii) As the subject of entrepreneurship is wide-reaching how was the analysis reduced, while retaining sufficient depth, and ensuring a representative understanding of the philosophies used?
Operationalising the Paradigms
The issue of permeability versus incommensurability remains a controversial issue.
In order to use BM's paradigms to review another field of study it was necessary to make some decisions about how to view the paradigms boundaries. Researchers supporting incommensurability argue that the boundaries are immutable. By immutable they mean that ideas and concepts cannot easily flow between paradigms because the philosophical basis of knowledge in each paradigm is entirely different (Jackson and Carter, 1991) . Those advocating permeability between paradigms, however, accept greater communication suggesting that while the paradigms are clearly at odds there is scope for knowledge to permeate between them at the transition zones (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) . When taking a position on the way in which knowledge is constructed, it is evident that this debate is somewhat of a non-starter, in the sense that the paradigms and continua constructed by Burrell and Morgan are themselves social constructions (Parker, 1998; Nightingale and Cromby, 1999) . They are useful because they can be used as a tool to explore the underlying meaning of theory but 'exist' only in the sense that they describe current social science research activity. Even as descriptions of underlying philosophical assumptions they are less than perfect depending on dualism ii (Willig, 1999) , as represented by the use of continuums, which tends to be an over-simplification of the debates. Consequently, in this analysis the paradigms and dichotomies iii were viewed as social constructions iv that could be used to help describe social science research activity. They are considered useful because they can be used to explore theory (Willmott, 1993a; Parker, 1998; Nightingale and Cromby, 1999) .
Permeability occurs because the research paradigms represent social processes where communication between research groups can happen (Willmott, 1993b) .
Incommensurability also exists because philosophical assumptions when made automatically exclude alternatives (Scherer and Steinemann, 1999) .
In operational terms problems were encountered when applying BM's paradigms to entrepreneurship. The concept of duality and the use of dichotomies, for example, presented questions when explaining differences of emphasis between meta-theories that derived from the same paradigm. It was also difficult to transfer the original criteria used to interpret study in organisational studies, as these were not reported explicitly. The first issue was resolved by reconceptualising the dichotomies. A metaphor of an elastic band was used at the same time as the concept of continua, individual dualities remain but there are different degrees of emphasis within paradigms (see Figure II) .
[take in Figure II] The research followed the approach used by Morgan and Smircich (1980) by allowing for different forms of approach within continua while retaining the dichotomous nature of the assumptions. The second issue meant that there were no clear criteria that could be used to apply BM's paradigms to another research field. This factor initially limited the transferability of the paradigms and their usefulness as tools of explanation. It was resolved for the subjective -objective dimension by building on the work of Morgan and Smircich (1980) , which outlined key criteria for six points along each of BM's four dichotomies. It was resolved for the regulation-radical change dimension by undertaking an analysis of the sociology literature with an emphasis on 'Marxism', 'conflict theory' and 'functionalist sociology'. From the source material three core dichotomies were identified and six different forms of philosophical assumption within each were highlighted. The dichotomies represented philosophical assumptions about change, structure and conflict in society. Appendix I and II provide a summary of the criteria used for both dimensions.
Focusing the Paradigms on the Study of Entrepreneurship
The challenge in this study was to capture an understanding of the philosophies guiding study in entrepreneurship while creating a manageable research study. A full analysis of the subject would have been comprehensive but unmanageable and would potentially have lacked sufficient depth, failing to understand the core philosophical assumptions embedded in the subject. To resolve this issue a historical approach was taken, which focused on the economic approaches to entrepreneurship and the study of entrepreneurial behaviour (Pittaway, 2000) . This research paper focuses on the economic approaches. It does so because the study of the 'entrepreneur' had featured strongly in economics but 'disappeared' in the 1930s (Barreto, 1989) , only reappearing in works deriving from transaction cost economics (Casson, 1982) and Neo-Austrian Economics (Kirzner, 1973) . The entrepreneur's disappearance from economic enquiry occurred twice, firstly from macroeconomic enquiry during the split between macroeconomic theory and microeconomic theory (Kirchhoff, 1991) and, secondly, from microeconomic theory as the theory of the firm began to dominate (Barreto, 1989) . It is probable; therefore, that the philosophies on which these approaches were based might have implications for the study of entrepreneurship.
The contribution of economics to understanding has also been complicated in modern theory because of the growing intra-disciplinary conflict between macro-and microeconomics. New interest in economics has been simulated by a greater focus on this conflict and it has been argued that entrepreneurship could be a catalyst for a paradigm shift in economics (Kirchhoff, 1991) .
Economic approaches consequently provide a useful starting point to examine the philosophies underpinning the historical roots of the subject because they provide a context where entrepreneurship was studied but disappeared and where its re-emergence may have unforeseen consequences for the prevailing paradigm (Hébert and Link, 1988; Barreto, 1989) . The following research questions were asked:
What are the meta-theoretical assumptions underpinning economic study in entrepreneurship?
ii) How can these be categorised according to BM's paradigms?
iii) Are there any philosophical explanations for the decline of 'the entrepreneur' in economic enquiry? iv) Are there any commonly used philosophies that could limit research in entrepreneurship?
DISCUSSION
These research questions guided the study, which is reported in full in Pittaway (2000) . Table II provides a summary of the findings of this analysis using BM's framework.
The study used an in-depth historical review of the economic literature and its contribution to entrepreneurship, starting with the work of Cantillon (1931) .
[take in Table II] The categorisation of economic theories in entrepreneurship has previously been undertaken by chronological order (Hébert and Link, 1988; Binks and Vale, 1990; Lydall, 1992) or by 'school of thought' (Ricketts, 1987; Chell et al., 1991) . Neither of these approaches has captured the underlying differences between theories based on their philosophies. As Barreto (1989) illustrates, however, philosophies may have played an important role in the decline of the 'entrepreneurial concept' in economics. The disappearance of the 'entrepreneur' from neo-classical economics (1930s onwards) was explained in his work by the rise of the theory of the firm and its use of assumptions that derived from a mechanistic v philosophy. Given Barreto's argument, it is possible that certain philosophical assumptions may have a pivotal influence on how 'entrepreneurship' is perceived and understood, even to the extent that the concept can effectively disappear from theorising. Kirchhoff (1991) illustrates the point when he discusses the axioms vi that exist within macroeconomic theory:
"With these axioms, macroeconomic theory eliminates the role of individually initiated behaviour. If these axioms apply, then buyers and sellers are "non-decision makers" who follow set rules in carrying out their day-to-day purchasing/producing functions.
Entrepreneurship cannot exist because it requires rule-violating behaviour" (Kirchhoff, 1991: 97) In both macroeconomic theory and the theory of the firm the gradual erosion of purposeful behaviour has led to an uncomfortable context for entrepreneurship and this has occurred despite the fact that significant contributions were made to understanding in early economic theory. Economic theories continue to contribute to the field but there are diverse opinions in economics about the nature of 'entrepreneurship' and whether it exists in a dynamic, static or turbulent economic system, as well as, debate about what role it plays in such a system. Within the theories analysed there was considerable difference regarding assumptions about 'human behaviour'. For example, in Kirzner's (1980) work an assumption of human behaviour can be illustrated in his definition of the pure entrepreneur:
"…a decision-maker whose entire role arises out of his alertness to hitherto unnoticed opportunities" (Kirzner, 1980: 38) In Kirzner's research the role of the 'entrepreneur' derives from an assumption that human behaviour is bounded by its context and entrepreneurial capacity arises from an ability to recognise opportunities and make decisions in an existing set of circumstances. When compared to Schumpeter's (1963) concept of new combinations there is a difference in the presuppositions made. For Schumpeter, the assumption of human behaviour has a greater element of 'agency' vii , indeed the role of the entrepreneur is to create new circumstances rather than to be alert to new opportunities in existing circumstances. Both approaches apply some idea about human action but they differ in degree and nature and some form of determinism viii remains.
Within the economic theories major theoretical and practical differences exist regarding the nature of the scientific enterprise, between subjectivity ix and objectivity works. Despite these differences, one can conclude from the research that the majority of economic approaches had used functionalist assumptions. This was a consequence of theorists' desire to explain how 'entrepreneurship' worked in the economic system and what function it had in that system (Binks and Vale, 1990) . By trying to explain how entrepreneurship impacts on economic systems these theorists tend to view it as a universal phenomenon xiii and consequently do not apply the individualistic axiom xiv held widely in contemporary study (Ogbor, 2000) . Regardless of this presupposition of universality, however, there was little agreement about what the 'entrepreneurial' function actually entailed (Lydall, 1992) . For example, it has been used to mean forms of behaviour (Schumpeter, 1963) , types of decisions (Knight, 1921) and types of people (Say, 1880) .
Indeed, many of the ambiguities surrounding the definition of entrepreneurship in contemporary study would appear to have their foundation in the economic domain (Hébert and Link, 1988) .
Another common philosophy running across the economic theories was the use of different forms of determinism. For example, 'entrepreneurs' were reduced to relatively powerless figureheads in the extreme determinism of microeconomics (Barreto, 1989) and, despite the use of concepts related to human action in the theory of creative destruction, Schumpeter's (1934) approach returned to psychological determinism xv to describe the individual entrepreneur. The philosophies linking the economic approaches, therefore, were some form of determinism and a universal philosophy with regard to theories in social scientific research. There were, however, some clear differences in study and these have been categorised into three groups: equilibrium, disequilibrium and revolution-equilibrium theorists (Pittaway, 2000) .
Equilibrium Theorists
Classical, neo-classical and microeconomic theorists who had made some contribution to the study of entrepreneurship dominated the equilibrium group e.g. Say,
Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, Mill, Walras, Marshall, Clark, Dobb and Tuttle (Barreto, 1989) .
In this group, theorists have sought to identify fundamental 'laws' to explain the economic system. The subsequent models developed tend to be of a mechanistic nature, are mainly prescriptive xvi and tend to assume that there are general principles explaining society, as is evident in general equilibrium theory. In these approaches, individual human action does not play a significant role and even at the collective level human behaviour is explained by general principles. Change within economic systems also tends to be modelled according to stable state or equilibrium philosophies. Marshall's (1961) macroeconomic welfare theory, for example, is now well-known for its introduction of rationality axioms xvii about human behaviour in exchange theory and for creating many of the axioms on which general equilibrium theory is based (Walsh, 1970) . Kirzner (1980) , Barreto (1989) and Harper (1996) have criticised these approaches as having neglected the entrepreneurial function because of their disregard for philosophies of human action and their over-application of mechanistic models. The assumptions used in the theory of the firm provide an illustration of the validity of these criticisms. The production function, the concepts of rational choice and perfect information all limit the capacity for 'entrepreneurial' behaviour (Barreto, 1989) . These underpinning philosophies explain why the 'entrepreneurial' concept is not addressed directly by microeconomic theory. In these approaches the 'firm', for example, represents its own 'reality', which is abstracted from the motivations, rationality and fallibility, associated with individuals. The calculation of inputs, including intangibles such as quality of decision making, assumes a capacity to measure inputs divorced from specific human capacity, as well as, assuming that unknown events will not dislodge the factors of production. microeconomists. But all the microeconomic research has not led to the development of a theory even close to the elegance and rigor of general equilibrium theory". (Kirchhoff, 1991: 103)
The failure of neoclassical theory to incorporate entrepreneurship can be explained by its axiomatic assumptions on human nature. It is possible to conclude that equilibrium theorists apply extremely determinist, realist xix , positivist xx , mechanistic and ordered views of social science and the social world and that these can create difficulties for the conceptualisation of 'entrepreneurship' despite its many guises (Barreto, 1989; Pittaway, 2000) .
Disequilibrium Theorists
Set against these approaches are those that incorporate concepts of entrepreneurship into variations of mainstream economics. These have included two forms of transaction cost economics. The first introduced a theory of regularity in exchange processes based on the cognitive limits of human actors (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) , which moved away from assumptions based on human rationality and perfect choice. The second sought to directly link concepts based on theories of information, information exchange and information markets to the process of entrepreneurship (Casson, 1990; . Unlike these theorists the disequilibrium theorists, who included Austrian and Neo-Austrian economists (Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1982) as well as the work of Knight (1921) and Cantillon (1931) , did not attempt to construct equilibrium models of the economic system based on general principles but sought explanations based on observations of experience. The models created tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive and tend to observe that equilibrium did not occur in the 'real' economy. Models based on disequilibrium suggested that there are opportunities for profit within economic systems because of inequalities between supply and demand and 'entrepreneurial' actions are designed to exploit these opportunities, driving economic systems toward equilibrium. This orientation is represented in Cantillon's definition of the entrepreneur and Knight's critique of classical theories.
"…set up with a capital to conduct their enterprise, or are undertakers of their own labour without capital, and they may be regarded as living of uncertainty" (Cantillon, 1931: 55) "…it is a world of change in which we live and a world of uncertainty. We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact we know so little. This is true of business as of other spheres of activity. The essence of the situation is action according to opinion, of greater or less foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect knowledge, but partial knowledge" (Knight, 1921: 199) The disequilibrium group applies two philosophical assumptions that differentiate it from the equilibrium theorists. They use more complex assumptions about human action and accept greater uncertainty in social systems. Jones (1998) illustrates this perception of human behaviour when he discusses transaction cost economics.
"Indeed, they explicitly rejected imperfect knowledge and unforeseen circumstances as providing any rationale for the existence and organisation of the 'classical firm'. The new institutional theory of the firm that was to follow turned this position on its head, arguing that in many instances the growth of the firm was designed precisely to overcome market failures, especially the costs and difficulties of transacting in markets under conditions of uncertainty" (Jones, 1998: 13) .
The move away from perfect knowledge as an axiom in transaction cost economics, while retaining elements of equilibrium theorising allowed for a more sophisticated view of bounded rationality xxi introducing greater uncertainty into exchange relationships. Although it shares elements with Neo-Austrian economics there is clear disagreement about the value of opportunistic (entrepreneurial) behaviour within conditions of uncertainty. In early transaction cost economics opportunistic behaviour is viewed quite negatively while in Neo-Austrian economics it has a more positive orientation. In the former it is the consequence of disequilibrium while in the latter it is the equilibrating force. Disequilibrium theorising, therefore, provides a complex disagreement between humans as positive actors and negative abusers of opportunity. At once being the guiding force behind equilibrium and being the exploiters of disequilibrium. Despite these differences, however, both approaches do provide an assumption about human behaviour that is quite different from that applied in equilibrium theories. Within these theories one can see more voluntarism xxii and less determinism than is present in equilibrium theories, as well as, greater evidence of human action, bounded rationality and concepts of information exchange. The nature of society within the disequilibrium group is also viewed to be more unstable and open to unpredictable changes, for example:
"…every action is embedded in the flux of time…In other words the entrepreneurial element cannot be abstracted from the notion of individual human action, because the uncertainty of the future is already implied in the very notion of action. That man acts and that the future is uncertain are by no means two independent matters, they are only two different modes of establishing one thing" (Kirzner, 1990: 81) .
Uncertainty, not predictability enters as the guiding force behind economic systems. In terms of BM's paradigms these approaches remain functionalist in orientation but apply assumptions that allowed for human influence over economic structures, recognising the limits of knowledge, information and expecting greater unknown disequilibrating forces to impact on economic systems in unexpected ways.
Revolution-equilibrium theorists
The third group of theorists has been described as the revolution-equilibrium group (e.g. Schumpeter, Cole, Knies, Roscher, Hildeband). The principle philosophies originate from the work of Schumpeter. Within this group three presuppositions exist. Firstly, theorists take the concepts of human action and choice a step further, secondly, they assume economic and social systems experience radical rather than incremental changes and, thirdly, they advocate greater linkage between historical 'facts' and abstract models. Schumpeter (Kilby, 1971) takes the concepts of human action further by arguing that while the entrepreneurial function may be mingled with ownership and management of resources the key function of the 'entrepreneur' was the person who innovates or makes 'new combinations' of production. Human action is conceptualised at the individual rather than the collective level (Shionoya, 1997) . For example:
"These concepts are at once broader and narrower than the usual. Broader, because in the first place we call entrepreneurs not only those 'independent' businessmen…but all who actually fulfil the function…even if they are… 'dependent' employees of a company… On the other hand, our concept is narrower than the traditional one in that it does not include all heads of firms or managers or industrialists who merely operate an established business, but only those who actually perform that function" (Schumpeter, 1971: 54) The difference for the individual is related to behaviour, in the sense that in a static system the individual can become accustomed to his/her own abilities and experience and their usefulness. In a dynamic system, however, the individual must become accustomed to uncertainties and must interact with them. Operating a business in conditions of uncertainty is quite different from operating one where certain knowledge exists.
"Carrying out a new plan and acting according to a customary one are things as different as making a road and walking along it" (Schumpeter, 1971: 56) Assumptions about human action, therefore, differ from those applied by theorists in the disequilibrium group because individuals create new opportunities rather than respond to existing ones. This conception may derive from the second philosophical difference focusing on the nature of social systems, which holds that economic systems go through radical discontinuous changes. Schumpeter moves away from equilibrium theories by arguing that creative destruction involves periods of stability in economic systems followed by periods of transformation, within which he places the entrepreneurial function. This departure illustrates far greater usage within the functionalist paradigm of concepts of social conflict derived from Marxism and BM's radical structuralist paradigm and these are evident when one analyses in detail the concept of creative destruction (MacDonald, 1971) . In direct contrast to Ogbor's (2000) critique, therefore, within this perspective the 'entrepreneurial' function involves the destruction of the current social order not its maintenance.
The final philosophies that differentiate this group of theorists derive from their views about social science research and Shionoya (1992; 1997) has examined these in detail. In summary research is viewed as a more inductive process, theories are used as mechanisms to help explain 'reality' and are viewed as abstractions that can be used to interpret observations. Such concepts are embedded in their historical context, are accumulated over time and are socialised within society, for example:
"The kind of data that is missing in entrepreneurial analysis could, in Schumpeter's opinion, best be supplied through qualitative data or by 'economic historians' and not economic mathematicians… According to Schumpeter, it is only through an intimate collaboration between facts and theory that it would be possible to make substantial advances in the study of entrepreneurship." (Ogbor, 2000: 623) .
"Nobody can hope to understand the economic phenomenon of any, including the present, epoch who has not adequate command of historical facts and an adequate amount of historical sense or of what might be described as historical experience", (Schumpeter, 1954: 12-13) This view of social science is near the boundaries between BM's interpretive and functionalist paradigms as it illustrates the important place of subjectivity and contextualism in research.
Results of the Analysis
The analysis of the economic approaches using BM's paradigms shows three distinct modes of theorising based on different philosophical assumptions about social science and society. As a consequence 'entrepreneurship' within these modes of theorising is quite different and events based on a variety of philosophies about human behaviour, change and social science have led to mutually exclusive concepts. For example, the difference between Schumpeter's and Kirzner's 'entrepreneur' is profound. This review using BM's paradigms also found that any form of purposeful behaviour as implied in most theories of entrepreneurship is obliterated from enquiry if functionalist assumptions are too extreme.
The work of Barreto (1989) and Hébert and Link (1988) support this conclusion, it was highlighted historically by Schumpeter (1954) and confirmed by Bygrave (1989) and Kirchhoff (1991) . Hébert's and Link's (1988) conclusion captures the point perfectly.
"One lesson to be learned from all of this is that the problem of the place of entrepreneurship in economic theory is actually not a problem of theory. It is a problem of method. The history of economic theory clearly demonstrates that the entrepreneur was squeezed from economics when the discipline attempted to emulate the physical sciences by incorporating the mathematical method. Clearly, mathematics brought greater precision to economics, and thereby promised to increase powers of prediction. Yet the introduction of mathematics was a two-edged sword. Its sharp edge cut through a tangled confusion of real world complexity, making economics more tractable, and accelerating its theoretical advance. However, its blunt edge bludgeoned one of the fundamental forces of economic life -the entrepreneur.
Since there was not then, and is not now, a satisfactory mathematics to deal with the dynamics of economic life, economic analysis gradually receded into the shadows of comparative statics, and the entrepreneur took on a purely passive, even useless role." (Hébert and Link, 1988: 158, added emphasis) Although this paper would prefer to substitute the term 'a problem of method' for the term 'a problem of meta-theory'. It is clear from the experience of the theory of the firm that certain assumptions about reality and knowledge, which may have led to the use of the mathematical method, created difficulties for understanding dynamic economic systems that depend upon human endeavour. The essential point that can be drawn is that economic theories that adopted equilibrium models, applying extreme functionalist assumptions, have tended to eradicate meaningful interpretations of entrepreneurship from their inquiry as a consequence of the philosophies used.
CONCLUSIONS
Ogbor (2000) described entrepreneurship as being dominated by the theories of social control and Grant and Perren (2002) described it as being dominated by functionalist enquiry. On the one hand, this study agrees with both critiques, it does appear that the economic foundations of entrepreneurship have applied major axioms within their study. It is further evident that the study of entrepreneurship has not explicitly analysed the metatheoretical assumptions in economic studies and many of these meta-theories do indeed appear to be dominated by functionalist enquiry. On the other hand, both critiques of the subject are somewhat in danger of over simplifying the differences, as this analysis found a range of historical works that used assumptions based on other BM paradigms and found a great deal of diversity within the functionalist paradigm. For example, the core theories derived from Schumpeter applied Marxist concepts and there are significant elements of human action in many theories. In general, therefore, the research found that there was evidence of diversity in the meta-theories used but there was less evidence of philosophies drawn from other BM paradigms, somewhat supporting Grant's and Perren's (2002) conclusions. This deduction can perhaps be viewed both positively and negatively. For those wishing to expand these foundations and draw more widely from other BM paradigms than is currently the case the current diversity indicates a tolerance for alternative views and approaches. For those wishing to create a more 'scientific' paradigm the dominance of functionalist enquiry does provide a foundation for further consolidation.
Based on the analysis conducted in this study it is argued that extreme functionalist assumptions do little to help, and a great deal to restrict, the study of entrepreneurship. The main research objective as outlined was to explore if there were any philosophical reasons why the concept of the entrepreneur disappeared from macro and micro-economic enquiry.
The common thread discovered was the application of extreme functionalist assumptions in a desire to construct a 'scientific' approach to the subject. The problems for such philosophical assumptions are outlined as follows:
i) Extreme realist ontological assumptions tend to hypothesise that the social world represents an external structure, which is tangible and existing of many interrelated parts. Such an 'objective' assumption about social reality has led theorists to consider social behaviour to be somewhat unchanging and immutable, as is evident in the concepts of perfect information and the production function in the theory of the firm. Entrepreneurship, however, appears to be about change to social structures and social reality whether that is the exploitation of opportunities during periods of disequilibrium, via the deliberate creation of new opportunities or indeed through new forms of sensemaking in society. Such realist assumptions as those applied in extreme functionalism provide little opportunity for the 'entrepreneurial' function to change society in unpredictable ways.
ii) Relatively strong forms of positivism appear to be problematic for the study of entrepreneurship because they require greater degrees of mathematical precision that depend on accurate definitions. Problems of definition remain inherent to the subject and where they have been drawn around the firm they appear to lose much of the complexity and dynamism that is incorporated into wider interpretations of entrepreneurship. For example, most recently attempts have been directed at making 'entrepreneurship' synonymous with the behavioural act of venture creation. For a positivist this is inherently attractive, but it risks applying the same philosophical assumptions that led the theory of the firm to cast the 'entrepreneur' as the powerless figurehead of a 'firm', which itself became 'the reality' abstracted from the actions of people (Barreto, 1989) . A simplification of the definition can lead to more positivism and can lead to the development of a 'scientific' paradigm. When focusing purely on venture creation, however, one disregards Schumpeter's argument that entrepreneurship, as a function of change in society, occurs in variety of contexts (Schumpeter, 1934) .
iii) Determinism applied in an extreme way also appeared to present difficulties for understanding the subject. Theories can rule out philosophies of human action and choice, which appear to be crucial to understanding entrepreneurship, by suggesting that forces outside of an individual's control are the main influence on their
behaviour. Yet observations of 'entrepreneurship' suggest that the 'entrepreneur' takes control of their environment in order to create new things; that they aspire to have independence from the domination of forces outside of their control (Chell, 2000) . Philosophies based on human action would appear to be relatively important when conceptualising how 'entrepreneurship' impacts on the development of new economic and social realities.
iv) The use of mechanistic metaphors to explain how social systems work can also have negative consequences. Even within the economic theories where the focus of study is the function of 'entrepreneurship', assumptions about the nature of human behaviour are endemic. It would appear that one of the major philosophical dilemmas for the study of entrepreneurship is that it is intricately tied to philosophies about human nature. Mechanistic assumptions sit uncomfortably with the subject because they tend to rule out behavioural complexity and ascribe law like qualities to social interactions.
These philosophical difficulties illustrate that the subject of 'entrepreneurship' could gain significantly if the meta-theoretical base of study is broadened (Grant and Perren, 2002) .
Based on this analysis one can certainly argue for expanding work in both BM's interpretive and radical structuralist paradigms. Interpretive approaches would introduce greater voluntarism, human action and be able to accept greater diversity in social meaning, while radical structuralist approaches could build on Schumpeter's application of Marxist concepts explaining how 'entrepreneurship', which can be conceived in this context as purposeful behaviour, creates radical change.
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Adapted from; Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 22 Radical Gioia and Pitre, 1990, p.591 (Barreto, 1989) 2 Excluding Cantillon (1931) 3 Includes Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) 4 Based principally on Casson's work (1982; 5 Includes Cantillon (1931) 6 Based on Knight (1921) 
